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ACADEMIC FREEDOM IN THE "GUARDED"
INSTITUTION
DOUGLAS B. MCKECHNIE AND ERIC MERRIAM*
I. INTRODUCTION
With the recent conversation surrounding free speech on col-
lege campuses, one group of institutions is often forgotten-United
States military service academies. Charged with graduating commis-
sioned military officers, service academies play a unique role as both
military training facilities and accredited higher education institu-
tions. Faculty at service academies aspire, no less than faculty at ci-
vilian institutions, to provide an elite education for their students
and produce superior, innovative scholarship. However, they face
distinct challenges to their academic freedom. Whether through
public pressure or explicit, systemic institutional policies that act as
prior restraints, service academy faculty are confronted with public
scrutiny and review of their scholarship prior to publication that can
have a chilling effect on academic freedom. Indeed, for some service
academy faculty, speech is constrained by the force of criminal law.1
* Professor McKechnie is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Law at the
United States Air Force Academy. Professor Merriam is an Associate Professor
at the University of Central Florida where he holds a joint appointment o the
Departments of Legal Studies and Political Science. Professor Merriam pre-
viously served as an active duty faculty member and assistant professor in the
Department of Law, United States Air Force Academy. The views expressed here
are the authors' alone and are not necessarily the position of the United States,
Department of Defense, United States Air Force, United States Air Force Acade-
my, or University of Central Florida.
1 See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. 888, 933-34, discussed in Part IV, infra. Another issue we do
not address here is to what extent hese free speech restrictions on active duty
military members limit student academic expression. While a professor posing
the question, "Is the conflict in Syria legally authorized?" might not get the pro-
fessor into difficulty, what about the cadet's answer, "Yes, I think the President
has dragged us into an illegal war?"
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The fundamental issue is that in the service academy context,
the service academies attempt to perform an educational function
comparable to that of civilian institutions, but are restricted in the
way in which they can accomplish that function. Free speech has
long been considered an essential bedrock of the civilian educational
enterprise. It is protected not only by the First Amendment but
through employment arrangements such as tenure designed in large
part to protect faculty from institutional and external pressure to
avoid articulating controversial or unpopular ideas. The service
academies' educational components are accredited by the same bo-
dies that accredit civilian institutions of higher education, but the fa-
culty seem constrained from delivering the same, robust educational
product. For some, the departure from the civilian academic expe-
rience is not a problem-the service academies perform a different
function with a different outcome. Indeed, service academies are not
chartered solely to educate, but to produce military officer leaders.
However, though we acknowledge the overall mission of the service
academies is decidedly different from that of their civilian counter-
parts, we do not believe that excuses or justifies providing an educa-
tion that is ideologically constrained.2
2 We recognize that service academies are certainly not the only higher educa-
tion institutions that have restrictions on faculty free speech. A prime example
is the faith adherence requirement many private religiously-affiliated colleges
and universities impose on faculty, which has the effect of also being a speech
restriction. See, e.g., Camila Domonoske, Professor Who Said Christians Muslims
Share a God is Leaving Christian College, NPR (Feb. 7, 2016),
http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-
way/2016/02/07/465916095/professor-who-said-christians-muslims-share-
a-god-is-leaving-christian-college. We believe there are two notable differences
between private schools and service academies that suggest service academies
ought not be permitted to restrict their faculty speech in the same way. First is
the public versus private distinction; service academies cannot violate the First
Amendment, while private schools can limit speech in ways that would violate
the First Amendment if they were government actors. Additionally, we think the
product of the service academies is different. As future military officers and
members of the government who will oversee and respond to diverse people
and ideas, it is not in the Nation's interest to limit the ideas to which the cadets
are exposed during their education. Simply stated, a civilian student is welcome
[Vol. 14314
GUARDED INSTITUTION
This Article argues that service academy professors have ex-
plicit and implicit limitations on their freedom of speech that can
have a chilling effect on academic freedom. The Article suggests that
academic freedom is restricted in distinctive ways by the schools
themselves, society, and career considerations. Part II is a case study,
of sorts, where we explore the public backlash against a controver-
sial article authored by a professor at the United States Military
Academy. We discuss the implications of the reactions to the article
and the need for a reaffirmation of academic freedom for service
academy faculty. Part III identifies institutionalized policies that act
as a prior restraint on scholarship produced by service academy fa-
culty. We argue that those policies violate academic freedom and can
have a deleterious, chilling effect on scholarly pursuits. Finally, in
Part IV we consider servicemember faculty in particular, exploring
the limits placed upon them by uniquely military speech crimes and
career concerns after they leave their teaching assignments at the
academies.
II. TRAHISONDESPROFESSEURS, BACKLASH, AND THE REAFFIRMATION OF
ACADEMIC FREEDOM
A. The Article
In its Spring/Summer 2015 edition, the relatively new stu-
dent-edited National Security Law journal published an article by
William C. Bradford, titled Trahison des Professeurs.3 Bradford's ar-
to self-limit the views she is likely to hear during her college experience while a
cadet should not be.
3 William C. Bradford, Trahison des Professeurs: The Critical Law of Armed Con-
flict Academy as an Islamist Fifth Column, 3 NATL SEC. L.J. 278,
https://www.nslj.org/wp-content/uploads/3_NatlSecLJ2 78-
461_Bradfordl.pdf. In a footnote describing the author, Bradford is listed as an
Associate Professor of Law at the National Defense University and National De-
fense College in Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates. Id. at 278, n.*. The journal is
published at the George Mason School of Law. As the title of the journal sug-
gests, it aims to publish scholarship exploring "national security law, including
topics relating to foreign affairs, intelligence, and national defense." About Us,
NAL SEC. L.J., https://www.nslj.org/about/ (last visited March 10, 2016). The
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ticle tested the outer limits of the journal's commitment to diverse
viewpoints, and arguably blew right past them. Bradford's thesis as-
serts that a cabal of "elites," including the media and members of the
United States government, are eroding the will of the American
people to fight "Islamists"4 by focusing on instances of United States
war crimes and its failure to abide by the laws of armed combat
(LOAC).5 These actors within United States society are the Islamists'
psychological operation force-multipliers in their asymmetric war
with the West 6 The majority of the piece, however, focuses on the
"third element of the triumvirate" cabal-academics that write scho-
larship critical of, or argue for restrictions on, the United States' use
of force in military conflicts.7 Bradford spends countless pages col-
lecting and critiquing various scholarly LOAC arguments with which
he disagrees.
For example, Bradford criticizes arguments that a person de-
tained during armed conflict is either a combatant or a civilian and
that the LOAC does not recognize a third category-"unlawful com-
batants."" Similarly, he criticizes arguments that those who do not
fall under the Geneva Convention's protection for Prisoners of War
must nonetheless be entitled to protection from coercive interroga-
tion and receive due process.9 In addition, Bradford argues that
LOAC scholars hypocritically "condemn state actors when human
shields are killed but withhold criticism of Islamist defenders who
Journal invites submissions representing diverse and original contributions to
national security law. Id.
4 Bradford defines "Islamists" as "individual [s] and groups who use or advocate
force to recreate the Caliphate...." Bradford, supra note 3, at 282 n.5.
s Id. at 290-91.
6 Id. at 284, 293.
7 Id. at 296. In an attempt at either grade school humor or clever wit, Bradford
refers to these LOAC scholars as "CLOACA"-contemptuously critical LOACA
scholars-undoubtedly knowing that a "cloaca" is the part of the body of some
animals into which body waste empties before it is expelled. Id. at 301; See
Cloaca, ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA http://www.britannica.com/science/cloaca
(last visited March 10, 2016).
8 Id. at 312-13.
9 Id. at 313.
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employ them."1 0 As yet another example, the piece criticizes the ar-
gument that the United States' use of Unmanned Arial Vehicles-
drones-to engage in targeted killing is akin to extrajudicial killing
and assassination." Academics, Bradford argues, have facilitated the
release of unlawful combatants detained by the U.S. by arguing that
the U.S. has engaged in torture.12 Bradford's analysis can be summed
up as a reproach of LOAC scholarship that he believes is too con-
straining for the United States and too permissive for its enemies. He
avers that these, and similar arguments, enable enemies of the Unit-
ed States and increase the risk to United States forces.1 3
Standing on their own, Bradford's critiques discussed above
seem well within the norms of scholarly discourse. However, Brad-
ford does not limit his piece to criticisms of other scholars' work. He
lumps these scholars together into a monolithic entity worthy of
blanket opprobrium for their kneejerk assumptions that the United
States' use of military force is immoral and for their failure to hold
Islamists accountable for their own war crimes.1 4 Bradford's piece
most antagonistically stretches the limits of rationality when he
turns from his doctrinally specific responses to certain scholarly
LOAC arguments and accuses those authors of engaging in material
support for terrorism through their scholarship.15 He derisively re-
fers to scholars with whom he disagrees as anti-American cowards
who are intellectually dishonest and useful idiots comprising a Fifth
Column for Islamists.16 Based on these arguments, he proffers that
"disloyal" scholars should be terminated from their employment and
charged with treason and material support of terrorism.17 Departing
even further from reality, he asserts that these scholars, the schools
10 Id. at 325-26.
11 Id. at 317.
12 Id. at 341-42.
13 Id. at 314-15.
14 See id. at 301.
15 Id. at 359-60.
16 Id. at 424-33.
17 Id. at 447-49.
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in which they teach, and their home offices are lawful targets for mil-
itary strikes because of their status as unlawful combatants."
However ludicrous Bradford's piece may be, it appears to
have initially gone, for the most part, unnoticed or ignored.19 Save
from the community of LOAC scholars, it may have remained so.20
However, once he was hired by the United States Military Academy
at West Point (USMA) as an assistant professor in early August 2015,
the article became international news.2 1 On August 29, 2015 the
Guardian newspaper published an article titled West Point Professor
Calls on US Military to Target Legal Critics of War on Terror.22 The
Guardian detailed Bradford's arguments and quoted the National Se-
curity Law journal's editor-in-chief describing the article's publica-
tion as an egregious mistake.23 Within days, Bradford resigned from
the USMA, reportedly because of misstatements about his prior mili-
tary service.24 At the same time, Professor Ilya Somin of George Ma-
18 Id. at 449-50.
19 The website Opinio Juris published an editorial criticizing Mr. Bradford's
piece on August 17, 2015. However, its author did not discuss his recent hire at
the United States Military Academy. Kevin Jon Heller, The National Security Law
Journal Outdoes the Onion, OPINIO JURIS (Aug. 17, 2015, 8:56 PM),
http://opiniojuris.org/2015/08/17/the-national-security-law-journal-outdoes-
the-onion/.
20 Michael E. Miller, West Point Law Professor Resigns After Advocating Attacks




"[e]ven before the Guardian's article, academics had complained about Brad-
ford's article.").
21 Spencer Ackerman, West Point Professor Calls on US Military to Target Legal





24 Matt Ford, The West Point Professor Who Contemplated a Coup, ATLANTIC (Aug.
31, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/08/west-point-
william-bradford/403009/; Andrew Tilghman, West Point Professor Resigns Af-
ter Inflamitory Article, MILITARY TIMES, (Sept. 2, 2015, 8:40 AM),
[Vol. 14318
GUARDED INSTITUTION
son University School of Law ridiculed the piece and cited another
colleague's astonishment at Bradford's premise.25 The professors al-
so admonished the journal for failing its obligation to publish only
quality scholarship.26
B. Reaffirming Academic Freedom
Whether Trahison des Professeurs adds something useful to
the scholarly discussion of LOAC is better left to others more versed
in the nuances of LOAC. The article, however, is not only a topic for
LOAC scholars to discuss. The piece presents a more fundamental
challenge for those of us who teach at service academies. How do we
join the chorus rejecting Bradford's assertions, while at the same
time avoid undermining the academic freedom we have the right to
insist upon from our institutions, the media, and the public? Service
academies are under a spotlight in which other higher education in-
stitutions do not often find themselves. They are responsible for gra-
duating the future leaders of one of the most powerful organs of our
society. One wonders whether Bradford's piece would have gained
international notoriety had he not been a professor at the USMA.
Certainly the service academies retain the institutional academic
freedom to hire those professors they believe will effectuate their
educational missions.27 However, once hired, service academies, and
the nation's interest in them producing well-educated officers capa-
http://www.militarytimes.com/story/military/2015/09/01/west-point-
professor-william-bradford/71530668/.
25 Ilya Somin, Student-Edited "National Security Law Journal" Repudiates Article
That Advocates Targeting Legal Scholars as "Enemy Combatants" in the War on






27 See Alisa Chang, Resuscitating the Constitutional "Theory" of Academic Free-
dom: A Search for a Standard Beyond Pickering and Connick, 53 STAN. L. REv. 915,
952-53 (2001).
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ble of thinking critically, can only be served by ensuring the market-
place of scholarly work is unencumbered for their professors.28
With the swift backlash that occurred in Bradford's case,
there is a possibility that professors at service academies will receive
the message that it is undesirable to explore controversial topics,
whether directly related to the military or otherwise. The consistent
linking of Bradford with the USMA, the amplified newsworthiness of
the piece because of his employer, the unwanted attention to USMA,
and his abrupt resignation, all have the potential to chill the scholar-
ly pursuits of service academy faculty. Professors at service acade-
mies who might otherwise test orthodoxy or challenge the staus quo,
no matter their discipline, may avoid drawing attention to them-
selves or their institution. They recognize that service academies
fear bad publicity as much as, if not more than, any other higher edu-
cation institution. Because of Bradford's experience, professors may
fear that scholarship that would otherwise only be read by those in
their discipline will instead become an international news story.
They may also fear that that sort of attention may result in the insti-
tution distancing itself and reevaluating the professor's employment
This apprehension is of particular concern for those professors who
have not attained tenure or who work at a service academy that does
not provide tenure. This apprehension would be lamentable.
An academic's scholarship should stand on its own merit,
without relation to his institution. If Bradford's piece is unworthy of
a scholar at a service academy, then it is because it is unworthy of a
scholar, not because he is employed by a service academy. This is not
to suggest that those professors who pilloried and derided Brad-
ford's piece sought to discourage academic freedom. To the contrary,
their reactions to his piece were part of a well-functioning market-
place. Bradford was able to find a journal that, rightly or wrongly,
published his piece. Scholars in the field then responded to his piece
28 Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) ("The Nation's future
depends upon leaders trained through wide exposure to that robust exchange
of ideas which discovers truth 'out of a multitude of tongues, [rather] than
through any kind of authoritative selection."') (quoting United States v. Asso-
ciated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943)).
[Vol. 14320
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by lambasting it and the journal for publishing it. And weak scholar-
ship should be derided. However, that derision must be accompanied
by the concomitant pledge that, however absurd his proposals, he is
"entitled to full freedom in research and in the publication of the re-
sults . "29
Lest the reaction to Bradford's piece discourage service
academy faculty, they must be affirmatively assured that academic
freedom is as much their right as it is the right of academics at other
institutions. This right should be guaranteed even if they write about
national security, the use of military force, or the way in which the
military or government functions. A professor who receives her pay-
check from the Department of Defense should not think it is accom-
panied by an expectation that her scholarship will necessarily con-
form to the military or government's messaging. She must feel free to
challenge conventional wisdom in her discipline. Indeed, it is be-
cause she works for a rigidly hierarchical organization that pos-
sesses the power to criminalize insubordinate and contemptuous
speech that her academic freedom must be more stridently affirmed.
Who better to be a protected voice of dissent, critique, or, perhaps
defense of government or military policy than someone from within?
In addition to academic freedom in their scholarship, service
academy faculty must also be free to explore unorthodox ideas in the
classroom without being daunted by public or media backlash sum-
marized by the comment: "I hope they're not teaching their students
that stuff." Because service academies hold themselves out as elite
institutions of higher education, they must establish and defend, in
the face of public pressure, their faculty's academic freedom to en-
courage a discipline-based, robust debate within the professor's
classroom. The professors are not military "trainers." They are not
responsible for simply presenting students with data and insisting
on memorization and regurgitation. To the extent that training is ne-
cessary for the students' military career, they will, and should, re-
29 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure with 1970 In-
terpretive Comments, AM. AsS'N OF UNIV. PROFESSORS 14 (1970),
http://www.aaup.org/file/1940%2oStatement.pdf.
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ceive that elsewhere in their academy experience.30 Professors at
service academies should be expected to play the same role for their
students as professors at civilian institutions. While they undoubted-
ly have the ethical responsibility to refrain from teaching untruths,31
they must also be free to engage their students in thought experi-
ments, theses defense, and exposure to unconventional ideas, espe-
cially those ideas that challenge military orthodoxy.
For example, consider a legal studies class at a service acad-
emy that explores the laws that govern the use of military force. In
the first instance, as with her civilian counterparts, the service acad-
emy professor is responsible for knowing and teaching the state of
the law. However, the classroom educational experience should not
stop there. The professor must be free, indeed expected, to explore
the boundaries of the law, the soundness of the law, and the poten-
tial for change in the law. Moreover, the professor must be free to as-
sess critically the United States' compliance with existing law. For
the public, media, or others to expect that professors avoid these
questions with their students for fear they will not be able to distin-
guish the law "as it is," from what it "should be," "could be," and
"should not be" is to infantilize the students and expect less of them
than would be expected of students at other higher education insti-
tutions. To be sure, students at service academies are just as likely as
their civilian counterparts to hear presidential candidates suggest
"carpet bombing" an enemy32 or killing combatants' family mem-
30 In part, one's view on the necessity of full academic freedom for service acad-
emy faculty is premised on the belief that the faculty at a service academy have
a distinct role from the military training staff. Recognizing the overall purpose
of service academies to produce officers for the nation's military, we do not con-
tend that everyone in a service academy environment should enjoy full academ-
ic freedom. Service members involved in training cadets "how to be an officer,"
or how to shoot a pistol, for example, do not need full academic freedom. This
distinction will be objected to by some military faculty-and indeed some ser-
vice academy administrators-who do not see the education role as wholly dis-
tinct from the training role. Many service member faculty consider themselves
to have the dual role of educators and trainers, professors and mentor officers.
st Chang, supra note 27, at 934.
32 Chris Magerian, Ted Cruz Wants to "Carpet Bomb" Islamic State, but with Some
Limits, L.A. TIMEs (December 15, 2015, 9:25 PM),
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bers.33 However absurd those ideas may be, the classroom is the fo-
rum to confront, test, defend, or reject them without fear that the
public or media will decry a military service academy that "teaches
students that stuff."
Bradford's article, for all its absurdities, presents an oppor-
tunity. It is an opportunity to reassert hat service academy faculty
aspire to the same level of intellectual curiosity and scholarship as
their colleagues at civilian institutions. While service academies
function as a commissioning source for the military, the faculty who
teach and research at those institutions must be equally as engaged
in the robust exploration and debate of ideas as their civilian coun-
terparts. If they are to succeed as scholars, then their academic free-
dom must be trumpeted, even while occasionally castigating a single
work that fails to meet professional standards. In addition, the public
and media should not assume or expect that the faculty avoid con-
tentious and difficult ideas in the classroom. It should be no less
shocking that service academy faculty have the same academic free-
dom, indeed expectation, to confront their students with difficult
questions. We do a disservice to the graduates of service academies
and their professors if academic freedom is questioned either in
scholarly pursuits or in the classroom.
III. INSTITUTIONAL PRIOR RESTRAINT AND ITS POTENTIAL FOR CHILLING
ACADEMIC FREEDOM
A. Institutional Policies
In light of Bradford's article and resignation, despite our dis-
agreement with his assertions, we find it necessary to defend against
the prospective threat to academic freedom posed by some service
academies' potentially chilling institutional policies regarding scho-
http://www.latimes.com/politics/la-pol-sac-ted-cruz-carpet-bomb-20151215-
htmlstory.html.
3 Tom LoBianco, Donald Trump on Terrorists: 'Take Out Their Families', CNN
(Dec. 3, 2015, 12:19 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/12/02/politics/donald-
trump-terrorists-families/.
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larship..34 The original source of these policies lies in a Department
of Defense Directive (DoDD) that governs the clearance of Depart-
ment of Defense (DoD) information for public release.35 DoDD
5230.09 is an operational instruction that applies to all organizations
within the DoD, including service academies, and requires that all in-
formation produced by students and faculty that is intended for pub-
lic release must first be submitted for review and clearance.36 It di-
rects that "clearance shall be granted if classified information is not
disclosed, DoD interests are notjeopardized, and the author accurate-
ly portrays official policy, even if the author takes issue with that pol-
icy." 37 The breadth and vagueness of the emphasized language dem-
onstrate the wide latitude the military maintains to squelch
academic scholarship that is contrary to perceived military interests.
34 The use of the word "some" is intentional because it appears that while the
USMA and the U.S. Air Force Academy (USAFA) have institution-level policies
applicable to all professors regarding the need for institutional "clearance" of
scholarship prior to publication, the United States Naval Academy (USNA) ap-
parently does not. See USAFA's FOI 35-101; Army Regulation 360-1, The Army
Public Affairs Program, U.S. DEPT. OF THE ARMY (May 25, 2011),
http://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/pdf/r360_1.pdf (applies to the USMA [herei-
nafter AR 360-1]. Nevertheless, Department of Defense regulations apply to the
USNA whether they have a service or "local" implementing instruction. See, e.g.,
Department of Defense Directive No. 5230.09, Clearance of DoD Information for
Public Release, U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE (Aug. 22, 2008), para. 2.a.,
http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/523009p.pdf
s Department of Defense Directive No. 5230.09, Clearance of DoD Information for
Public Release, U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE (Aug. 22, 2008),
http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/523009p.pdf [hereinafter
DoDD 5230.09].
36 Id. DoDD 5230.09 curiously claims to "ensure a climate of academic freedom"
by exempting from this requirement papers or materials that will not be re-
leased outside the institution. Id. at 2. While student papers will often meet this
requirement, we suspect most faculty spend little time producing academic pa-
pers that are not intended for release outside the institution. Thus, while DoDD
5230.09 begins by espousing academic freedom, it then goes on to limit academ-
ic freedom for the scholarly work that academic freedom is most oft sought.
This sleight of hand invokes the biblical passage from the book of Job: "the Lord
giveth, and the Lord taketh away." job 1:21.
37 DoDD 5230.09, supra note 35, at 2 (emphasis added).
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Army Regulation 360-1, which essentially incorporates the
DoD language above, applies to the USMA.38 The United States Air
Force Academy (USAFA), however, has created its own "Faculty Op-
erating Instruction," FOI 35-101, to effectuate DoD 5230.09.39 Nota-
bly, both Army Regulation 360-1 and FOI 35-101 originate as "Public
Affairs" directives from the U.S. Army and within USAFA, respective-
ly.40
The USAFA's FOI 35-101 creates a clearance process by
which all faculty are required to submit any material planned for
public release.4 1 The material must be submitted to both the faculty
member's department head and the Director of Research. In addition
to reviewing for security issues and "policy consistency," the de-
partment heads are expected to serve as the subject matter experts
and competent authorities for their disciplines.42 The Director of Re-
search is the Dean's Public Affairs Representative and also provides
a security and policy consistency review.4 3 While the objective is
"maximum" clearance, the materials must not be contrary to the na-
tional interest and security, must "accurately" portray official policy,
may not conflict with the public receiving prompt and complete in-
formation, may not conflict with law, and may not "conflict with ethi-
cal standards, or otherwise be incompatible with the responsibilities
of the government personnel."44 If a manuscript is not cleared for
publication, there is a procedure by which a faculty member can ap-
peal the decision.45 In addition to the need for clearance of publica-
tions, if a media outlet requests an interview of a faculty member,
38 AR 360-1, supra note 34.
39 On file with author.
40 Id.; AR 360-1, supra note 34.
41 United States Air Force Academy Faculty Operating Instruction 35-101,
Clearance of Material for Public Release and Academic Freedom, January 24,
2008. In the interest of full disclosure, and appreciating the irony, we note this
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the faculty member is required to coordinate the response and ar-
range the interview through the Public Affairs office.46
B. Prior Restraints and Their Chilling Effect
To the extent that both the Supreme Court and commenta-
tors have considered the idea of academic freedom, it has often been
through the lens of the First Amendment's commitment to open and
robust debate.47 That robust debate, particularly in academia, culti-
vates critical inquiry and brings about change and progress in socie-
ty.48 University professors play a role as "priests of our democracy,"
responsible for cultivating and practicing that exchange of ideas.4 9 If
academic freedom is corollary to our commitment to free speech as
embodied in the First Amendment, then First Amendment principles
must inform its understanding.
Perhaps the first and most important principle that led to the
adoption of the First Amendment was rejection of prior restraints on
expression.50 The Court has defined prior restraints as a requirement
that one's speech be submitted "to an official who may grant or deny
permission to utter or publish it based upon its contents."51 There is
a heavy presumption that prior restraints are unconstitutional.52 The
disdain for prior restraints on speech lies in the preference of a "free
society ... to punish the few who abuse rights of speech after they
break the law than to throttle them and all others beforehand."5 3 The
46 Id.
47 See, e.g., Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967); Rebecca Gose
Lynch, Pawns of the State or Priests of Democracy? Analyzing Professors' Aca-
demic Freedom Rights Within the State's Managerial Realm, 91 CAL. L. REv. 1061,
1096 (2003).
48 Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 195-97 (1952).
4 Id. at 196.
50 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 51-52 (1919) ("It well may be that the
prohibition of laws abridging the freedom of speech is not confined to previous
restraints, although to prevent them may have been the main purpose .... ); see
also Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 451 (1938).
st Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544, 566 (1993).
52 Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963).
s See Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 559 (1975).
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purpose of this Article is not to explore the legality of prior restraints
on scholarly publications. However, if academic freedom exists as a
consequent interest to First Amendment values, then prior restraint
on scholarly work should be presumed to be anathema, and a viola-
tion of academic freedom, only justified in the most limited, excep-
tional circumstances.5 4
For most civilian scholars, any review and clearance process
would be unheard of as they demand, and receive, the freedom to
publish their scholarship "without interference from political or ec-
clesiastical authority, or from the administrative officials of the insti-
tution .... ." The expectations of service academy faculty should be
no different. They should be free to share their ideas in the same way
as their civilian colleagues. No less than their civilian colleagues, they
are paid to develop theories, to speak, to write, and to teach about
their intellectual labors in all stages of the creation, dissemination,
and reformulation of those ideas.56 However, the need to attain de-
partmental and institutional approval may chill the topics a faculty
member decides to explore and develop. There is a disincentive to
investigate ideas one may perceive her department head, or the in-
stitution, thinks unworthy of scholarly pursuit, too divergent from
the status quo, or too close to the line of prohibited scholarship. This
is particularly so in the case of faculty who are not yet tenured or at
institutions that do not offer tenure. In addition, the requirement
that a scholar submit her work for internal approval may discourage
the best faculty members from joining the institution altogether.
Moreover, as the internal review and clearance process is at
least in part related to public affairs concerns, it seems to imply that
s4 Undoubtedly there are some disciplines, at civilian and military institutions,
that have various legal limitations on the sharing of their scholarship. For ex-
ample, there are laws that prohibit the sharing of certain technology. See, e.g.,
22 U.S.C., ch. 39 (2015) (regulating arms exports). However, there should not be
a blanket review process applicable to all disciplines simply because a handful
requires it. Each department's need for a review process should be assessed
and instituted only where necessary to comply with the law.
ss Arthur Lovejoy, Academic Freedom, 1 ENCYC. OF THE Soc. Scis. 384, 384 (1930).
56 Jennifer Elrod, Academics, Public Employee Speech, and the Public University,
22 BUFF. PUB. INT. L.J. 1, 64 (2004).
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the academic mission and one of its primary pillars-scholarship-is
a matter of public affairs or "optics." Undoubtedly, for various rea-
sons the public and media often hold service academies to a different
standard when compared with other higher education institutions.
They are often too quick to attribute the actions of a few to the entire
institution. Nevertheless, scholarly writing should not be viewed
with an eye towards public relations. It should be viewed through
the lens of scholarship's purpose: to add value, perspective, and
enrichment to a discipline. Certainly faculty trumpet academic free-
dom because their scholarship may challenge, offend, or make
people uncomfortable. However, to aspire to the highest ideals of
academic freedom, the marketplace and professional peers should
determine whether a piece is worthy of publication, not the institu-
tion. To be sure, the administrations within service academies may
find themselves confronted with "disagreeable" scholarship from
their faculty. Yet it is better to deal with the public relations concerns
of the few who draw unwelcome attention through their scholarship
"than to throttle them and all others beforehand."57
When discussing the need for institutional and departmental
clearance before publication, it is often suggested that the depart-
ment head and institution need to be forewarned if a faculty member
plans to publish a scandalous piece. That suggestion, however, furth-
ers the potentially chilling effect of the policy. Faculty at civilian in-
stitutions rely on the administration to raise the shield of academic
freedom to deflect public criticism of a professor's scholarship. A
professor who is asked to forewarn his institution before publishing
an edgy piece could receive the message that the institution is so
concerned about getting ahead of the public reaction that it is best to
avoid placing the institution, and perhaps the professor himself, in
that position. In addition, or in the alternative, it is suggested that if a
department head knows about his faculty's avant-garde scholarship,
he can provide "coverage" for the faculty member if her work would
cause discomfort for the institution. This too presents a potentially
chilling message. To the extent the department head's review of
57Promotions, Ltd., 420 U.S. at 559.
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scholarship places him in a position to provide coverage, it invites
the disturbing question: Coverage from what? 5
The need for institutional awareness of scholarly pursuits
seems to be a unique response engrained in the operational military.
Commanders in the military are expected to have intimate know-
ledge of, and take responsibility for, their subordinates' behavior-
both professional and personal.59 The commander's effectiveness is
then judged by the subordinates' performance of their tasks. Unlike
academia, however, a commander's subordinates are expected to
perform a specific task in line with their training.60 The success of a
particular mission is not directly tied to the innovation of ideas or
theories that the soldiers produce.61
Some service academies have imported that supervi-
sor/supervisee relationship into the university setting, though it
seems at odds with the role professors play in higher education. In
particular, the requirement that a professor seek prior approval be-
fore publication fails to recognize a professor's unique duties and
role within the institution. The role of professors, whether at civilian
or military institutions, is to "put their views on public display al-
most daily through their scholarship, research, public statements,
classroom teaching, and community service."62 While uniformity of
task performance and irect supervisory responsibility is valuable in
the operational military and other professions, academics succeed
when they are utterly free to "test[], retest[], and refine[]" their theo-
ries in an open exchange of ideas.63 Indeed, it is when their ideas are
58 Department heads, and seemingly the institution writ large, are expected to
know what their subordinates are publishing and, if confronted with the unor-
thodox or controversial work of a professor, they are expected to have know-
ledge of it. This would seem unimaginable in a civilian institution; no depart-
ment head would be expected to have reviewed, be knowledgeable of, and
responsible for his professors' scholarship. However, holding a department
head responsible for what his professors writes fits with the expectations
placed on the supervisors in the operational military.
s Used here, "commander" is synonymous with "supervisor."
60 See Elrod, supra note 56, at 66.
61 Id.
62 See id. at 63.
63 Id.
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considered novel and cutting-edge that a scholar's efforts are consi-
dered a success.64 In addition, those professional successes aid the
institution by attracting other "sources of revenue, scholars, and stu-
dents."65 While strict supervisory responsibility is valuable in the
operational military, it can limit the professor's responsibility to
formulate theories and challenge students, thus subverting the goal
of higher education.66
IV. UNIQUE CONSIDERATIONS FOR MILITARY FACULTY AT SERVICE ACADEMIES
A. Legal Restraints
Though a significant focus of this Article is to identify extra-
legal constraints on academic freedom at the United States' military
service academies, it is important to recognize there are significant
legal constraints on a large percentage of their faculties as well. At
least two thirds of the faculty at the United States Air Force Academy
(USAFA) and United States Military Academy (USMA), and roughly
half of the faculty at the United States Naval Academy (USNA), are
active duty service members who experience real legal restraints on
their free speech, without exception for academic expression.67 The
64 See id.
65 Id.
66 Id. at 61.
67 The proportion of faculty who are military officers versus civilian employees
at each service academy varies. The USNA faculty is roughly 50 percent civilian,
while the USMA and USAFA hover between 25 and 40 percent. "Faculty" are
educators engaged in classroom instruction that is roughly consistent with the
understanding of that term in civilian academia. The term does not include the
many more service members and civilians engaged in "training" activities such
as teaching cadets how to shoot pistols or pilot aircraft. See Kirsten M. Keller,
et.al., The Mix of Military and Civilian Faculty at the United States Air Force Acad-
emy: Finding a Sustainable Balance for Enduring Success, RAND CORP. 5-6
(2013),
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/MG12 00/MG12 3
7/RANDMG1237.pdf. Aside from internal service academy policies, legal re-
strictions on the type of speech that might limit academic freedom are primarily
aimed only at military servicemembers. Though the Hatch Act of 1939 prohibits
political activity by certain federal government employees, including civilian
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Supreme Court has clearly and repeatedly emphasized that the mili-
tary is a separate society.68 In 1953, the Supreme Court said, "The
military constitutes a specialized community governed by a separate
discipline from that of the civilian." 69 The Court later applied this
"separation" to the free speech context, finding that servicemembers
do not enjoy the same First Amendment protections as their civilian
counterparts:
While the members of the military are not excluded
from the protection granted by the First Amendment,
the different character of the military community and
of the military mission requires a different applica-
tion of those protections. The fundamental necessity
for obedience, and the consequent necessity for im-
position of discipline, may render permissible within
the military that which would be constitutionally im-
permissible outside it.70
Because of the Court's restrictive understanding of service members'
free speech rights, we make no claim here that restrictions on ser-
vice academy faculty's free speech unconstitutionally violate the
First Amendment. Rather, we argue it is not in the academies'-and
the Nation's-interest o limit faculty speech in the way the military
departments and their service academies currently can. Simply
stated, when cadets at service academies learn from active duty ser-
vice member faculty, they are learning from individuals who are not
free to express views as broad, varying, and educational as their fa-
culty counterparts at civilian institutions.
Service member faculty are specifically constrained by sev-
eral provisions of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), to
which all active duty service members are subject Three articles of
the UCMJ are the most likely to be implicated by a professor engag-
ing in the type of speech that might ordinarily be considered pro-
faculty members, its prohibitions for civilians like service academy professors
do not restrict speech in a way that limits academic freedom.
68 See, e.g., Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 758 (1974); Orloff v. Willoughby, 345
U.S. 83, 94 (1953).
69 Orloff 345 U.S. at 94.
70 Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. at 758.
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tected academic expression:7 1 Article 88 prohibits "Contemptuous
Words Toward Certain Officials;" 72 Article 133 prohibits "Conduct
Unbecoming an Officer and a Gentleman;"73 and Article 134 prohibits
"Disorderly Conduct" that either prejudices good order and discip-
line or brings discredit upon the armed forces.74
Article 88 prohibits commissioned officers 75 from using "con-
temptuous words" against the President, Vice President, Congress,
Secretary of Defense, and other similar senior civilian officials. 76 The
statute does not define "contemptuous," leaving a significant ques-
tion regarding what types of comments are punishable. The Manual
for Court-Martial explanation of the offense states that adverse criti-
cism of an official in the course of a political discussion is not charge-
able.7 7 Rather, the comments must be personally contemptuous.78
While this limitation seems to insulate the kinds of genuine political
dialogue in which faculty might engage, the only reported appellate
case addressing an Article 88 conviction suggests otherwise.79 Addi-
tionally, aggravating circumstances include: "giving broad circulation
to a written publication containing contemptuous words," as a scho-
lar would when publishing; and "utterance of contemptuous words..
71 A host of other provisions could ostensibly be implicated, though we think it
unlikely. These include: Article 89, Disrespect of a Superior Commissioned Of-
ficer, 10 U.S.C. § 889 (2015); Article 92, Failure to Obey an Order or Regulation,
10 U.S.C. § 892 (2015); Article 104, Aiding the Enemy, 10 U.S.C. § 904 (2015);
and Article 117, Provoking Speech or Gestures, 10 U.S.C. § 917 (2015).
72 10 U.S.C. § 888 (2015).
73 10 U.S.C. § 933 (2015).
74 10 U.S.C. § 934 (2015).
7s To our knowledge, though enlisted members play a vital training role at each
service academy, all servicemember faculty are commissioned officers.
76 10 U.S.C. § 888 (2015).
77MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES, pt. IV, I 12c (2000) [he-
reinafter MCM].
78 Id.




. in the presence of military subordinates,"8 0 as a faculty member
might do with their cadet students in the classroom.
The paucity of modern Article 88 prosecutions leaves the
contours of this offense undefined.81 The only such conviction to re-
ceive appellate review since the UCMJ was enacted in 1950 was the
court-martial of Lieutenant Henry Howe, in which he was convicted
of violating Article 88 for holding a sign in a demonstration that read
"LET'S HAVE MORE THAN A'CHOICE' BETWEEN PETTY, IGNORANT,
FACISTS [sic] in 1968" on one side and "END JOHNSON'S FACIST
[sic] AGGRESSION IN VIETNAM."82 Howe was ostensibly convicted
because labeling the President's actions "fascist" and implying John-
son was a "petty, ignorant fascist" were considered contemptuous.83
One can see how this particular example might be troubling to mili-
tary faculty, such as those in academic disciplines like political
science, history, law, and military studies that assess presidential
policy, and who may have legitimate academic reasons to character-
ize various political officials and their actions as "petty," "ignorant,"
or "fascist" Indeed, recent popular discussion of whether a presiden-
tial candidate's policies are "fascist"8 4 highlights the possibility that a
professor may wish to publish serious analysis that concludes the
80 Manualfor Courts-Martial United States U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE IV-17 (ed. 2012),
https://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/MilitaryLaw/pdf/MCM-2012.pdf [hereinafter
Man ualfor Courts-Martial].
81 Over 100 general courts-martial for offenses under predecessors to Article 88
were convened during the Civil War and two World Wars. See John G. Kester,
Soldiers Who Insult the President: An Uneasy Look at Article 88 of the Uniform
Code of Military justice, 81 HARV. L. REv. 1697, 1720 (1968). The authors are
aware of only two such prosecutions since the UCMJ was enacted in 1950:
United States v. Howe, 37 C.M.R. 429 (1967) and that of Lieutenant Watada, Hal
Bernton, Army Charges Lieutenant Who Wouldn't Go to Iraq, SEATTLE TIMES (Jul.
6, 2006),
http://old.seattletimes.com/html/iraq/2003107653_watadacharged6m.html.
82 United States v. Howe, 37 C.M.R. 429, 433 (1967).
83 Id. at 445.
84 See, e.g., Jamelle Bouie, Donald Trump is a Fascist, SLATE (Nov. 25, 2015),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news-and-politics/politics/2015/11/donald-tr
ump-is-a fascist it is the-politicallabelthatbestdescribes.html M.J. Lee, Why
Some Conservatives Say Trump Talk Is Fascist, CNN (Nov. 25, 2015),
http://www.cnn.com/2015/11/24/politics/donald-trump-fascism/.
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policies are indeed fascist, and such expression may come even after
the candidate has been elected President Under current law, such a
conclusion would be unwise for a military faculty member to say or
publish.
Even more nebulous than Article 88 is the UCMJ's Article
133, which prohibits "conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentle-
man."85 Many varied activities fall within this proscription, includ-
ing but not limited to, cheating on an exam, public drunkenness, and
public association with known prostitutes.86 One well-known case of
an Article 133 prosecution for engaging in expressive activity is the
court-martial of Captain Howard Levy during Vietnam.87 Levy was
charged with violating Article 133 for making "statements variously
described as intemperate, defamatory, provoking, disloyal, contemp-
tuous, and disrespectful to Special Forces personnel and to enlisted
personnel who were patients or under his supervision."88 These
statements included encouraging black soldiers to refuse to deploy
due to racial discrimination and referring to special forces personnel
as "liars and thieves," "killers of peasants," and "murderers of wom-
en and children."89 As with Article 88, context matters regarding
whether statements constitute an offense, but the statements that
constituted a violation of Article 133 in this case should give servi-
cemember faculty pause. It is not difficult to imagine faculty at col-
leges and universities referring to military activity as "murder" or
suggesting servicemembers hould object to perceived racial inequi-
ty. However, the student cadets at a service academy will not hear
this view personally adopted or articulated by a cautious service-
member professor. In fact, the student cadet is quite likely to hear
only a vigorous denouncement of such views. Moreover, there is
85 Article 133 has been challenged as void for vagueness and thus providing in-
sufficient notice numerous times, but appellate courts have routinely upheld
the Article. See, e.g., Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 746-47 (1974); United States
v. Rogers, 54 M.J. 244, 256 (C.A.A.F. 2000); and United States v. Amazaki, 67 M.J.
666, 670 (A. Ct. Crim. App. 2009).
86 Manualfor Courts-Martial, supra note 78, at IV-100.
87 Parker, 417 U.S. at 733.
88 Id. at 739.
89 Id. at 737.
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strong disincentive for a military faculty member at a service acade-
my to declare United States military actions contrary to international
or domestic law.
The most indistinct of all UCMJ offenses may be Article 134,
which prohibits disorderly conduct hat is "to the prejudice of good
order and discipline" or brings "discredit upon the armed forces ...
."90 Though the Manual for Courts-Martial contains a list of specifical-
ly identified disorders that can be charged under Article 134, any
"disorder" that either disrupts good order and discipline or brings
discredit upon the armed forces may be charged.91 In the free speech
context, one such early case involved the court-martial of Private
First Class Allen McQuaid.92 McQuaid was an Air Force band member
who made a variety of assertions for which he was convicted under
Article 134, including claiming the Cold War was being waged by the
banking industry to protect an unfair economic system and that ser-
vicemembers with successful careers succeeded because they com-
promised their integrity and pandered to "capitalists and their hen-
chmen."93 McQuaid appealed to "guys who 'hate' the service" to
"follow the dictates of their own consciences."94 As in other cases de-
scribed above, McQuaid's comments are in the same vein one might
expect a professor to discuss, perhaps in the context of a course or
scholarship in political science, government, law, or military studies.
For example, a professor wishing to echo sentiment expressed in
some quarters that a particular military conflict was primarily con-
ducted for the benefit, or at the behest, of large military contractors
would essentially be making the same claims as McQuaid.
The number of appellate cases addressing Article 88, 133,
and 134 convictions in the free speech context is small, and often
those cases are old. It is difficult to know whether that is due to few
incidents of such expression, a general military sensitivity to First
Amendment concerns, or both. But the existence of such cases at all,
90 U.S.C. § 934 (2015).
91 Id.
92 United States v. McQuaid, 5 C.M.R. 525 (A.F.B.R. 1952).
93 Id. at 528.
94 Id.
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combined with unfettered commander discretion regarding charging
decisions, can have the effect of chilling speech by servicemember
faculty who might otherwise assert anti-administration or anti-
military positions in their role as educators.
Prosecution for engaging in political speech of the type a pro-
fessor might articulate is rare, but is neither hypothetical nor limited
only to decades-removed cases. In 2006, Army Lieutenant Ehren Wa-
tada was charged with violating Article 88 for contemptuous state-
ments, including:
[T]his administration was just continually vi-
olating the law to serve their purpose, and there
was nothing to stop them. Realizing the presi-
dent is taking us into war that he misled us ...
has broken the bond of trust that we had. If the
president can betray my trust, it's time for me to
evaluate what he's telling me to do.95
Additionally, Watada was charged with violating Article 133 for var-
ious statements, such as: The United States war in Iraq was illegal,
illegitimate, and contrary to "what the Constitution extols"; his par-
ticipation in the war would "make [him] party to war crimes"; he
was ashamed of wearing the uniform because of the deception used
to initiate the war; and that to stop an illegal and unjust war, soldiers
can choose to stop fighting it.96 While Lieutenant Watada was not a
professor at a service academy, the case is instructive because the
UCMJ applies equally to Lieutenant Watada and servicemember pro-
fessors. Again, Lieutenant Watada's comments are of the same type
one might expect a professor-perhaps in a law, political science, or
military studies course-to make in scholarship or to students. In
light of Articles 88, 133, and 134, such a military faculty member
9s Hal Bernton, Army Charges Lieutenant Who Wouldn't Go to Iraq, SEATTLE TIMES
(Jul. 6, 2006),
http://old.seattletimes.com/html/iraq/2003107653_watadacharged6m.html.
The Article 88 charges were dropped before trial. Ultimately, Watada's prosecu-
tion failed due to prosecutorial missteps and double jeopardy.
96 Full Text Of Watada Statements Cited In Army Charging Documents, SEATTLE




would have to be very cautious, if not completely avoid, making such
claims.
In addition to the statutory provisions identified above, mili-
tary regulations also limit certain forms of speech by all service-
members, and accordingly active duty faculty at service academies.
DoDD 1344.10 generally requires that members on active duty not
engage in partisan political activity, and that members not on active
duty avoid inferences that their political activities imply or appear to
imply official sponsorship, approval, or endorsement.97 The DoDD
specifically identifies some prohibited practices, while warning that
other activities not expressly prohibited may nevertheless be prohi-
bited if they are contrary to the "spirit and intent" of the Directive.98
Expressly prohibited activities that could arguably limit otherwise
legitimate academic expression include: "allow[ing] or caus[ing] to
be published partisan political articles, letters, or endorsements
signed or written by the member that solicits votes for or against a
partisan political party, candidate, or cause;" "speak[ing] before a
partisan political gathering, including any gathering that promotes a
partisan political party, candidate, or cause;" and "participat[ing] in
any radio, television, or other program or group discussion as an ad-
vocate for or against a partisan political party, candidate, or cause."99
Each of these broadly prohibited categories of activities in-
clude the types of academic speech in favor of or in opposition to a
political position, or possibly even specific candidate, in which aca-
demics often engage. For example, an international relations profes-
sor who wishes to publish an article detailing the anticipated ad-
verse international consequences of electing a particularly polarizing
presidential candidate-and arguing that voters should select
another candidate-would be prohibited. The prohibition of advoca-
cy for partisan causes is even more limiting, as it ostensibly limits
broader issue-based advocacy scholarship. And the degree to which
97 Department of Defense Directive No.1344.10, Political Activities by Members of
the Armed Forces, DEP'T OF DEFENSE 2 (February 19, 2008)
http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/134410p.pdf.
98 Id. at para. 4.1.5.
99 Id. at para. 4.1.2.3-4.1.2.6.
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a particular cause must be associated with a specific political party is
unclear. For example, might the close relationship between Federal-
ist Society members and the Republican Party (especially in the form
of judicial nominations) mean that advocating for or against Federal-
ist Society ideals is prohibited?10 0
Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) 1325.06 directs
military commanders to balance servicemember free speech rights
against national security and good order and discipline.1 0 1 Under
DODI 1325.06, military personnel may not:
actively advocate supremacist, extremist, or
criminal gang doctrine, ideology, or causes, in-
cluding those that advance, encourage, or advo-
cate illegal discrimination based on race, creed,
color, sex, religion, ethnicity, or national origin
or those that advance, encourage, or advocate
the use of force, violence, or criminal activity or
otherwise advance efforts to deprive individuals
of their civil rights.102
Here, the lack of specificity regarding what is "extremist doctrine,"
"extremist ideology," or "illegal discrimination" may chill some
speech in which military faculty members might otherwise engage.
For example, if a military studies professor wishes to publish an ar-
ticle advocating a return to male-only military service and notes with
approval organizations upporting that cause, has he violated this
regulation? What about a philosophy professor who advocates adop-
tion of some form of sharia law in predominantly Muslim communi-
ties in the United States?
100 See, e.g., MICHAEL AVERY & DANIEL McLAUGHLIN, THE FEDERALIST SOCIETY: How
CONSERVATIVES TOOK THE LAW BACK FROM LIBERALS (2013); David Fontana, A Small
Right-Wing Conspiracy: The Federalist Society, THE DAILY BEAST (JUNE 11, 2013),
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/06/11/a-small-right-wing-
conspiracy-the-federalist-society.html.
101 DoD Instruction 1325.06, Handling Dissident and Protest Activities Among
Members of the Armed Forces, DEP'T OF DEFENSE para. 3.b (Nov. 27, 2009),
http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/132506p.pdf.




Military faculty members at service academies also potential-
ly suffer from the chilling effect of adverse career consequences from
engaging in controversial or unpopular speech.1 03 At each major ser-
vice academy, the vast majority of military faculty are "rotational,"104
meaning they are assigned to teach at the service academy for an as-
signment only, and then are returned to operational roles in their re-
spective services.10 5 Military faculty members receive the same per-
formance evaluations as their non-faculty counterparts, and
negative, or even mediocre, performance reports due to a faculty
member's expression of unpopular opinions would follow that servi-
cemember for the remainder of their military career.106 Moreover,
knowing one must return to a specific military occupation provides
strong incentive not to criticize members of that occupation or its
leaders. For example, a pilot teaching at a service academy would
very likely avoid criticizing fellow pilots in the classroom or in scho-
larship, fearing subsequent reprisal from other pilots or being re-
quired to engage, perhaps hypocritically, in the same activity the fa-
103 As noted above, we are aware there are potential career concerns for civilian
faculty members at service academies, too, especially where tenure is not of-
fered.
104 A small percentage of military faculty at each major service academy enjoy
permanent positions on the faculty, whether through appointment as a "Per-
manent Professor" under federal law, 10 U.S.C. § 4336 (2015), or by service-
specific regulations permitting long-term assignment. See, e.g., HQ United States
Air Force Academy Operating Instruction 36-3520, Senior Military Faculty,
March 13, 2015, http://static.e-
publishing.af.mil/production/1/usafa/publication/usafai36-3520/usafai36-
3520.pdf
105 Instructor duty is typically a four-year assignment. See, e.g., Employment in
the Department of Political Science, U.S. AIR FORCE ACAD.,
http://www.usafa.edu/df/dfps/Employment/employmentpage.cfm. (last vi-
sited March 13, 2016).
106 See, e.g., AFI 36-2406, Officer And Enlisted Evaluation Systems, 30 November
2015, para. 1.1 (discussing the purpose of officer evaluation system, of which
annual performance reports are the primary component, "is to provide a relia-
ble, long-term, cumulative record of performance and promotion potential
based on that performance").
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culty pilot criticized. Similarly, a law professor might avoid attacking
the publicly expressed legal opinions of the Judge Advocate General
of her service, no matter how valid and worthwhile such scholarship
might be, fearing such statements would doom her subsequent ca-
reer progression. At this time, there are no institutional protections
for servicemember faculty who will return to their operational spe-
cialties following their "tour" as an instructor. This means the very
individuals best positioned, based on experience and education, to
challenge military orthodoxy are strongly disincentivized from en-
gaging in academic criticism of military activities. In general, the mil-
itary does not value dissent, and the non-academic military leaders
who control a servicemember's career are highly unlikely to excuse
such dissent because it was uttered while the servicemember was in
an academic position. Indeed, to many that notion is laughable.
V. CONCLUSION
One might observe that each of the above potential limita-
tions on free academic expression can be skirted if professors are
willing merely to present ideas, rather than advocating them. For ex-
ample, presenting the idea that "some have argued the United States'
use of force in Syria is without legal justification" is qualitatively dif-
ferent than affirmatively asserting "the war in Syria is illegal," with
the emphasized language essentially disassociating the professor
from the view. And while the successful classroom presentation of
that idea to cadets might occur through either articulation, this
presents a fundamental question: Is it the academic's role to advo-
cate rather than simply inform? If the answer is no, then the negative
effect of the legal restrictions dissipates greatly. However, we expect
that most scholars-certainly those in our discipline of law-would
argue the opposite. Whether a professor chooses pedagogically to
advocate or inform in the classroom, scholarship advocates a thesis,
and this type of speech by military faculty members is con-
strained.107
107 Indeed, one of the authors of this article once chose to forego publishing an
article in the national security law arena for the reasons stated above.
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Professors play a unique role in society. Unlike virtually all
other professions, they are charged with pondering, nurturing, and
sharing the ideas that often challenge conventional thinking. In order
to meet that charge they must be free to test and refine those ideas
with others, whether the public or experts in their field. If that free-
dom to submit ideas to the marketplace is limited by institutional
policies that serve a gate-keeping function, the result could be a cal-
culation by some that, for various reasons, it is best to not pursue a
particular line of inquiry or argument That would be regrettable be-
cause it is in that uninhibited zone of inquiry that the freest intellec-
tual experimentation can take place and, even by professors at ser-
vice academies, progress can be made.
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Professor ofLaw
JON P. McCLANAHAN, B.A., J.D., Assistant Dean for Academic Excellence and Clinical Associate Professor of
Law
PATRICIA HENNESSEY, B.S., Associate Dean for Finance and Information Technology
KRISTINE J. DAVIDSON, B.A., Associate Dean for Advancement
BIANCA MACK, B.A., J.D., Assistant Dean for Admissions
SYLVIA K. NOVINSKY, B.S., J.D., Assistant Dean for Public Service Programs
JOHN B. KASPkZAK, B.A., M.A.T., J.D., Assistant Dean for Student Services
DOUGLAS B. EDMUNDS, B.A., M.S., Assistant Dean for Information Technology
BRIAN D. LEWIS, B.G.S., M.A., Assistant Dean for Career Services
ALLISON L. REID, B.A., M.A., Assistant Dean for Communications
Faculty
DAVID S. ARDIA, B.S., M.S., J.D., LL.M., Assistant Professor Law and Co-Director of the Centerfor Media Law
and Policy
TAMAR R. BIRCKHEAD, B.A, J.D., Associate Professor of Law and Director of Clinical Programs
KIMBERLY C. BISHOP, B.A., J.D., Clinical Assistant Professor ofLaw
JOHN CHARLES BOGER, A.B., M.DIV., J.D., Dean and Wade Edwards Distinguished Professor ofLaw
LISSA LAMKiN BROOME, B.S., J.D., Wells Fargo Professor of Banking Law and Director of the Center for
Banking and Finance
ALFRED L. BROPHY, A.B., J.D., A.M., PH.D., Judge John J. Parker Distinguished Professor ofLaw
CAROLINE NICHOLSON BROWN, B.A., M.A., J.D., Professor ofLaw
PATRICIA L. BRYAN, B.A., J.D., LL.M., Martha Brandis Professor ofLaw
ALEXA Z. CHEW, A.B., J.D., Clinical Assistant Professor ofLaw
ANDREW CHIN, B.S., PH.D., J.D., Associate Professor ofLaw
JOHN MARTIN CONLEY, B.A., J.D., PH.D., William Rand Kenan Jr. Professor ofLaw
JOHN F. COYLE, B.A., M.PHIL., J.D., Assistant Professor ofLaw
MAxINE N. EICHNER, B.A., J.D., M.A., PH.D., Reef C. Ivey II Professor ofLaw
LEWIS MOORE EVERETT, B.A., M.A., J.D., Clinical Assistant Professor ofLaw
BARBARA A. FEDDERS, B.A., J.D., Clinical Assistant Professor ofLaw
VICTOR B. FLATT, B.A., J.D., Thomas F. and Elizabeth Taft Distinguished Professor in Environmental Law and
Director of the Center for Law, Environment, Adaptation and Resources (CLEAR)
TIMOTHY J. GALLINA, B.A., J.D., M.L.I.S., Clinical Assistant Professor of Law and Reference/Emerging
Technologies Librarian
DEBORAH R. GERHARDT, A.B., J.D., Assistant Professor ofLaw
MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, B.A., M.S., J.D., Samuel Ashe Distinguished Professor in Constitutional Law and
Director of the Center for Law and Government
S. ELIZABETH GIBSON, B.A., J.D., Burton Craige Professor ofLaw
RACHEL GURVICH, B.A., J.D., Visiting Clinical Assistant Professor ofLaw
DAVID R. HANSEN, B.S., M.S., J.D., Clinical Assistant Professor of Law and Reference Librarian
THOMAS LEE HAZEN, B.A., J.D., Cary C. Boshamer Distinguished Professor ofLaw
JEFFREY MICHAEL HIRSCH, B.A., M.P.P., J.D., Associate Dean for Academic Affairs and Geneva Yeargan Rand
Distinguished Professor ofLaw
DONALD5 THOMAS HORNSTEIN, B.A., J.D., Aubrey L. Brooks Professor ofLaw
MELISSA B. JACOBY, B.A., J.D., Graham Kenan Professor ofLaw
THOMAS A. KELLEY, II, A.B., J.D., Paul B. Eaton Distinguished Professor ofLaw
JOSEPH E. KENNEDY, B.A., J.D., Professor ofLaw
CATHERINE Y. KIM, B.A., J.D., Assistant Professor ofLaw
JULIE L. KIMBROUGH, B.A., J.D., M.L.S., Clinical Assistant Professor of Law and Assistant Director for
Collections and Access
P. ANNE KLINEFELTER, B.A., M.L.S., J.D., Associate Professor ofLaw and Director of the Law Library
JOAN H. KRAUSE, B.A., J.D., Associate Dean for Faculty Development and Dan K. Moore Distinguished
Professor of Law; Professor of Social Medicine in the School of Medicine; Adjunct Professor in the Gillings
School of Global Public Health
HOLNING S. LAU, B.A., J.D., Professor ofLaw
WILLIAM P. MARSHALL, B.A., J.D., William Rand Kenan, Jr. Distinguished Professor ofLaw
JON P. MCCLANAHAN, B.A., J.D., Assistant Dean for Academic Excellence and Clinical Associate Professor of
Law
CARLENE M. MfCNuLTY, B.A., J.D., Clinical Assistant Professor ofLaw
KEITH A. MCCRICKARD, B.A., J.D., Visiting Clinical Assistant Professor ofLaw
STEVEN J. MELAMUT, B.A., B.S., J.D., M.S.L.S., Clinical Assistant Professor of Law and Assistant Directorfor
Administration
ROBERT P. MOSTELLER, B.A., M.A., J.D., J. Dickson Phillips Distinguished Professor ofLaw
ERIC L. MULLER, A.B., J.D., Dan K. Moore Distinguished Professor ofLaw in Jurisprudence and Ethics
RICHARD E. MYERS H, B.A., M.A., J.D., Henry Brandis Distinguished Professor fLaw
GENE R. NICHOL, B.A., J.D., Boyd Tinsley Distinguished Professor of Law and Director of the Center on
Poverty, Work and Opportunity
DONNA L. NIXON, B.S., J.D., M.S.L.S., Clinical Assistant Professor of Law, Electronic Resources & Access
Librarian
WYATT B. ORSBON, B.A., J.D., LL.M., Visiting Clinical Assistant Professor ofLaw
JOHN V. ORTH, A.B., J.D., M.A., PH.D., William Rand Kenan Jr. Professor ofLaw
MARY-ROSE PAPANDREA, B.A., J.D., Professor ofLaw
GREGG D. POLSKY, B.A., J.D., LL.M., Willie Person Mangum Professor ofLaw
BETH S. POSNER, A.B., M.A., J.D., Clinical Assistant Professor ofLaw
GERALD J. POSTEMA, A.B., M.A., PH.D., Cary C. Boshamer Professor ofPhilosophy and Professor ofLaw
ALICE A. RATLIFF, B.A., M.A., J.D., Clinical Professor ofLaw
DANA A. REMUS, A.B., J.D., Associate Professor ofLaw
KATHRYN A. SABBETH, B.A., J.D., Assistant Professor ofLaw
OSCAR J. SALINAS, B.A., J.D., M.A., Clinical Assistant Professor ofLaw
MARIA SAVASTA-KENNEDY, B.A., J.D., Clinical Professor ofLaw and Director ofthe Externship Program
RICHARD S. SAVER, B.A., J.D., Arch T. Allen Distinguished Professor of Law and Professor of Social Medicine
in the School of Medicine; Adjunct Professor in the Gillings School of Global Public Health
NICK SEXTON, B.A., J.D., M.S.L.S., Clinical Assistant Professor of Law and Reference/Collection Development
Librarian
THEODORE M. SHAW, B.A., J.D., Julius L. Chambers Distinguished Professor ofLaw and Director ofthe Center
for Civil Rights
JAMES W. SHERWOOD, B.A., J.D., LL.M., M.L.I.S., Clinical Assistant Professor of Law and Reference/Foreign
and International Law Librarian
CRAIG T. SMITH, B.A., J.D., LL.M., Assistant Dean for the Writing and Learning Resources Center and Clinical
Professor ofLaw
ROBERT J. SMITH, B.A., J.D., Assistant Professor Law
LESLIE A. STREET, B.A., J.D., M.L.I.S., Clinical Assistant Professor of Law and Assistant Director for Research
and Instruction
KATHLEEN DELANEY THOMAS, B.S., J.D., LL.M., Assistant Professor ofLaw
SARA B. WARF, B.A., J.D., Clinical Assistant Professor ofLaw
JUDITH WELCH WEGNER, B.A., J.D., Burton Craige Professor ofLaw
W. MARK C. WEIDEMAIER, B.A., J.D., Ralph M. Stockton, Jr. Distinguished Scholar and Associate Professor of
Law
ARTHUR MARK WEISBURD, A.B., J.D., ReefC. Ivey II Distinguished Professor ofLaw
DEBORAH M. WEISSMAN, B.A., J.D., ReefC. Ivey IIDistinguished Professor ofLaw
ERIKA K. WILSON, B.S., J.D., Assistant Professor ofLaw
JANINE M. ZANIN, B.A., J.D., Clinical Assistant Professor of Law and Faculty Supervisor of the Externship
Program
Adjunct Faculty
MICHAEL R. ABEL, A.B., J.D., Adjunct Professor ofLaw
MICHAEL W. BALLANCE, B.A., J.D., Adjunct Professor ofLaw
SETH A. BLUM, B.A., M.A., J.D., Adjunct Professor ofLaw
ELIZABETH BRASWELL, B.A., J.D., Adjunct Professor ofLaw
JONATHAN E. BROUN, B.PH., J.D., Adjunct Professor ofLaw
MARY BETH CHOPAS, B.A., J.D., Adjunct Assistant Professor ofLaw
JOANNA CAREY CLEVELAND, B.A., J.D., M.P.A., Adjunct Professor ofLaw
DALE COHEN, B.A., J.D., Adjunct Professor ofLaw
FELICE M. CORPENING, B.A., J.D., Adjunct Professor ofLaw
KAREN DAVIDSON, B.A. J.D., Adjunct Professor ofLaw
KEARNS DAVIS, B.A., M.A., J.D., Adjunct Professor ofLaw
THE HONORABLE M. PATRICIA DEVINE, B.A., J.D., Adjunct Professor ofLaw
MARK E. DOROSIN, B.A., M.A., J.D., AdjunctProfessor ofLaw
JENNY DOYLE, B.A., B.B.A., M.A., J.D., Adjunct Professor ofLaw
JAMES C. DRENNAN, B.A., J.D., Adjunct Professor ofLaw
SHERRY HONEYCUTT EVERETT, B.A., M.A., J.D., Adjunct Assistant Professor ofLaw
TRISTAN FuIERER, B.S., PH.D., J.D., Adjunct Associate Professor ofLaw
JAMES C. FULLER, B.A., J.D., Adjunct Professor ofLaw
ANTHONY GAETA, JR., B.A., J.D., Adjunct Professor ofLaw
DEBORAH NAOMI GOLDSTEIN, B.A., J.D., Adjunct Professor ofLaw
BETH YOUNT GRIMES, B.A., J.D., Adjunct Professor ofLaw
MIKAEL GROSS, B.S.P., M.S., J.D., Adjunct Professor ofLaw
ELIZABETH M. HADDIX, B.A., J.D., Adjunct Professor ofLaw
DAVID L. HARRISON, B.S., J.D., Adjunct Professor ofLaw
R. HARPER HECKMAN, B.A., J.D., Adjunct Professor ofLaw
NORMA HOUSTON, B.S., J.D., Adjunct Professor ofLaw
MALCOLM HUNTER, B.A., J.D., Adjunct Professor ofLaw
SAMUEL S. JACKSON, A.B., J.D., Adjunct Professor ofLaw
ROBERT O. JENKINS, B.A., M.P.A., J.D., Adjunct Professor ofLaw
SALLY C. JOHNSON, B.S., M.D., Adjunct Professor ofLaw
VALERIE A. JOHNSON, B.A., J.D.,Adjunct Professor ofLaw
THE HONORABLE ABRAHAM JONES, B.A., J.D., Adjunct Professor ofLaw
MICHAEL G. KADENS, A.B., J.D., Adjunct Professor ofLaw
MAITRI KLINKOSuM, B.A., J.D., Adjunct Professor ofLaw
JOHN LOFTIN, B.A., J.D., Adjunct Professor ofLaw
RINA LYUBKIN, B.S., J.D., Adjunct Clinical Professor ofLaw
KELLIE D. MANNETrE, B.A., J.D., Adjunct Assistant Professor ofLaw
JAMES M. MARKHAM, B.A., J.D.,Adjunct Assistant Professor ofLaw
J. MATTHEW MARTIN, B.A., M.A., J.D., Adjunct Professor ofLaw
THE HONORABLE MARK D. MARTIN, B.S., B.A., J.D., LL.M., Adjunct Professor ofLaw
CHARLES STEVEN MASON, B.A., J.D., Adjunct Professor ofLaw
WILLIAM S. MILLS, A.B., J.D., Adjunct Professor ofLaw
JONAS J. MONAST, B.A., J.D., Adjunct Professor ofLaw
CHRISTINE C. MUMMA, B.S., J.D., Adjunct Professor ofLaw
BENTLEY OLIVE, B.S., J.D., Adjunct Professor ofLaw
SAMUEL T. OLIVER, B.A., J.D., Adjunct Professor ofLaw
THE HONORABLE ROBERT F. ORR, A.B., J.D., Adjunct Professor ofLaw
BARBARA J. OSBORNE, B.A., J.D., Adjunct Professor ofLaw
J. DICKSON PHILLIPS, III, A.B., J.D., Adjunct Professor ofLaw
LISA C. SCHIAVINATO, B.A., J.D., Adjunct Professor ofLaw
SCOTT L. SILLIMAN, B.A., J.D., Adjunct Professor ofLaw
ELLIOT M. SILVERSTEIN, B.A., J.D., PH.D., Adjunct Professor ofLaw
ELIZABETH SIMPSON, B.A., J.D., Adjunct Professor ofLaw
RAYMOND ALBERT STARLING, B.S., J.D., Adjunct Professor ofLaw
THOMAS M. STERN, B.A., J.D., Adjunct Professor ofLaw
ZEPHYR TEACHOUT, B.A., M.A., J.D., Adjunct Professor ofLaw
KATHERINE TOPULO, B.A., M.A., M.S.L.S., J.D., Adjunct Professor ofLaw
DEVON WHITE, A.A.S., B.A., M.A., J.D., Adjunct Associate Professor ofLaw
DORI WIGGEN, B.A., J.D., Adjunct Professor ofLaw
MELVIN F. WRIGHT JR., B.A., J.D, Adjunct Professor ofLaw
Faculty Emeriti
KENNETH S. BROUN, B.S., J.D., Henry Brandis Professor ofLaw Emeritus
MICHAEL L. CORRADO, B.A., B.S., A.M., PH.D., J.D., Arch T. Allen Distinguished Professor ofLaw
CHARLES EDWARD DAYE, B.A., J.D., Henry Brandis Professor ofLaw Emeritus
LAURA N. GASAWAY, B.A., M.L.S., J.D., Paul B. Eaton Distinguished Professor ofLaw Emeritus
PAUL HARDIN, B.A., J.D., Professor ofLaw Emeritus
PAUL G. HASKELL, A.B., J.D., LL.B., William Rand Kenan, Jr. Professor ofLaw Emeritus
JOSEPH JOHN KALO, B.A., J.D., Graham Kenan Professor ofLaw Emeritus
RONALD CHARLES LINK, A.B., M.A., J.D., Dan K. Moore Distinguished Professor ofLaw Emeritus
ARNOLD H. LOEWY, B.S., J.D., LL.M., Graham Kenan Professor ofLaw Emeritus
RUTH ANN McKINNEY, B.A., M.Ed., J.D., Clinical Professor ofLaw Emeritus
RICHARD A. ROSEN, B.A., J.D., Professor ofLaw Emeritus
WILLIAM J. TURNIER, B.S., M.A., J.D., Willie Person Magnum Professor ofLaw Emeritus
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